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1 
Iowa’s Last Liquor Battle: 
Governor Harold E. Hughes  
and the Liquor-by-the-Drink Conflict 
JERRY HARRINGTON 
THE DEEP, RESONANT VOICE of Iowa Governor Harold E. 
Hughes echoed throughout the packed Iowa House chamber on 
January 17, 1963, as he finished his half-hour inaugural address. 
Facing an audience that included all of Iowa’s representatives 
and senators in Des Moines for the new legislative session, the 
recently elected Democrat had just proposed an aggressive 
agenda for the overwhelmingly Republican legislature. 
 It was the speech’s final flourish, however, that so captured 
the nature of the new governor, a political personality many 
Iowa legislators were just beginning to size up. “It is sometimes 
said that the knack of skillful government is to hang back, do as 
little as possible, and make no mistakes,” Hughes said. “I hope 
there is another way—for between you and me, this prospect 
does not invite my soul.” Promising to “experiment and make 
some mistakes,” Hughes pledged to actively engage with legis-
lators to reform Iowa’s political landscape. Many of the Iowa 
politicians listening to these words undoubtedly believed that 
Hughes would apply this dynamic attitude to an issue that was 
on everyone’s mind and had been at the core of his campaign 
for governor—the question of liquor by the drink in Iowa.1 
                                                 
1. “Harold Hughes, Inaugural Address, 1/17/63,” Speeches—Oct. 1962–Jan. 
1963, box 27, Harold E. Hughes Papers, Special Collections, University of Iowa 
Libraries, Iowa City, Iowa (hereafter cited as HEH Papers); Des Moines Register, 
1/18/63. 
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 Political analysts at the time generally interpreted Hughes’s 
1962 election victory over incumbent Republican Governor 
Norman Erbe as a referendum on liquor by the drink. Citing 
widespread violations of the prohibition of over-the-counter 
liquor sales, Hughes had aggressively campaigned on allowing 
purchase of liquor drinks in bars, social clubs, and other estab-
lishments, complementing the existing legal sale of liquor by the 
bottle through state monopoly liquor stores. Either change the 
law or, Hughes pledged, he would enforce the current one. To do 
otherwise, he said, shows disrespect for all laws. To pass such a 
reform, however, the new governor would need to overcome 
resistance from a conservative, rural-based legislature that had 
long blocked the change. The debate across Iowa in the 1962 
gubernatorial campaign and the subsequent legislative approval 
of liquor by the drink dominated Iowa politics for nearly a year. 
 The liquor-by-the-drink question, however, was more than 
just a single campaign issue and legislative debate. The episode 
marked the culmination of more than a century of political con-
flict within Iowa over its citizens’ access to alcohol. Beginning 
with the state’s first General Assembly, Iowans and their elected 
officials had argued passionately over the issue, prompting so-
lutions ranging from outright prohibition to limited licensing of 
liquor sales in saloons to the sale of bottled liquor through state 
stores. Legalizing liquor by the drink in 1963 effectively ended 
that debate; it was the last political conflict in Iowa when the 
terms wets and drys were used. With that action, Iowans—
through their elected representatives—came to accept legal 
liquor sales in both bottle and glass, as long as the state en-
forced strict licensing laws and regulated the practice. If state 
and local governments collected fees from licenses and taxes, 
that was an added benefit. Political debates after this point were 
not over whether liquor should be openly sold but over such 
issues as the minimum drinking age, allowable alcohol levels 
for drivers, and whether bottled liquor should be sold through 
state monopoly stores or private businesses. Since 1963, limiting 
liquor sales to the general adult population has not been a viable 
political issue in Iowa.2 
                                                 
2. This article focuses primarily on the politics of the liquor-by-the-drink issue. 
It does not attempt to review the religious, moral, ethno-cultural, or social 
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 By the early 1960s, a majority of Iowans—at least according 
to opinion polls—favored liquor by the drink.3 The roadblock 
was the Iowa legislature—especially, many said, the House—
which was fundamentally apportioned by geography, not pop-
ulation, and dominated by more conservative rural interests. 
Hughes’s win and his successful effort to enforce existing liquor 
laws put intense political fire under the feet of recalcitrant legis-
lators. These and other factors prompted enough of them to 
modify their attitudes and support the change, ending this part 
of the state’s long-standing liquor argument. 
 This episode reflects a transitional moment in Iowa history, 
a shift from a rural state to an urban one. For the first time, the 
1960 federal census showed more Iowans living in “urban” areas 
than in “rural.” An expanding urban population, with its greater 
acceptance of liquor consumption, was overpowering more con-
servative rural opposition to easy access to alcohol. The liquor re-
formers’ triumph exemplifies the rise of Iowa’s urban interests.4 
 
LIQUOR ISSUES have been debated in Iowa for as long as it 
has been a state. The first Iowa General Assembly in Iowa City 
passed liquor control legislation in February 1847, giving county 
residents the option to vote on whether or not commissioners 
could grant liquor licenses in each county. In elections held in 
the frontier state on April 5, 1847, every established county ex-
cept Keokuk voted to prohibit liquor sales, but the prohibition 
was often overlooked, and commonly merchants either secretly 
                                                                                                       
conflicts that accompanied this long-standing and hotly debated issue among 
Iowans. All of those aspects of the historical liquor debate in Iowa are certainly 
important, but this study leaves those to other scholars. Iowa churches and 
religious groups are part of this discussion but only as lobbying and pressure 
groups that sought to affect the debate. I use the terms wet and dry, which 
were commonly used in liquor debates. Wets refers to those who supported 
expanded liquor availability; drys were those who wanted to limit liquor use. 
3. Des Moines Register, 5/13/1962.  
4. U.S. Census Bureau, Census of Population and History, Census of Popula-
tion: 1960-VI-Part 17, General Population Characteristics—Iowa. According to 
the 1960 census, 53 percent of Iowans lived in urban areas and 47 percent in 
rural areas. The 1950 census had recorded 47.6 percent of Iowans in urban areas 
and 52.4 percent in rural. The U.S. Census Bureau defined rural residents as 
anyone living outside of urban areas with a population of 2,500 or more.  
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or openly sold liquor illegally. By the early 1850s, the Maine Law, 
named after a state prohibitory law passed in Maine in 1851, 
was the rallying cry of prohibition forces and became part of 
the Whig Party platform in 1854. The next year, with the Iowa 
legislature under Whig control, both Iowa houses passed a law 
prohibiting the sale of liquor in Iowa and Whig Governor James 
Grimes signed it. On April 2, 1855, Iowa voters approved the law, 
25,555 to 22,645. But, according to historian Dan Elbert Clark, 
local officials “simply folded their hands and paid little heed to its 
enforcement.” In 1857 the General Assembly, responding to that 
reality, passed a liquor licensing law, allowing sales that would 
happen anyway, although prohibition remained on the books. 
Especially with the influx of German immigrants into the state, 
Clark notes, “prohibition seemed to fall into disfavor,” and by 
the 1860s “liquor was sold almost without restrictions.”5  
 Activists rallied in 1877 with a prohibition candidate for gov-
ernor who called for the law’s enforcement. He garnered more 
than 10,000 votes in a losing cause. That campaign—through 
speeches, correspondence, newspaper coverage, and networking 
throughout the state—helped revive the temperance movement 
and expanded support for curbs on liquor traffic. The next year, 
at the Woman’s Christian Temperance Union (WCTU) conven-
tion in Burlington, J. Ellen Foster, who chaired the committee on 
legislation, proposed amending the Iowa Constitution to prohibit 
liquor. That, she argued, would make prohibition a permanent 
part of Iowa law, removing it from the changing winds of year-
by-year politics. That effort gained enough popular support to 
prompt Iowa General Assemblies in 1880 and 1882 to pass a 
constitutional amendment banning the manufacture and sale of 
intoxicating liquor, including ale, wine, and beer. In June 1882 
Iowa voters approved the prohibition amendment, 155,436 to 
125,677, with 75 counties voting in favor. However, a Scott 
County district court that fall declared the amendment invalid 
on a technicality, because the amendments passed by the two 
sessions of the Iowa legislature had slightly different wording. 
                                                 
5. Dan Elbert Clark, “The History of Liquor Legislation in Iowa, 1846–1861,” 
Iowa Journal of History and Politics 6 (1908), 55–87; idem, “The History of Liquor 
Legislation in Iowa, 1861–1878,” Iowa Journal of History and Politics 6 (1908), 339–
74. 
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The Iowa Supreme Court upheld the decision in 1883, throwing 
the prohibition amendment out of the Iowa Constitution.6  
 Not wanting to begin the long, multiyear amendment pro-
cess again, prohibition supporters in the Iowa General Assembly 
passed a law banning intoxicating liquor in Iowa. The law went 
into effect on July 4, 1884, but despite attempts at enforcement, 
many cities, especially Iowa river towns, ignored it. According 
to Clark, “It is a commonly known fact that in many cases mu-
nicipal and county officials were elected solely on the condition 
that they would not attempt to enforce the prohibitory law.”7  
 The issue became a centerpiece of the 1889 gubernatorial race, 
resulting in the election of Iowa’s only Democratic governor 
between the Civil War and the Great Depression: Horace Boies, 
who opposed prohibition. Iowa Republicans, who could certainly 
read election returns, eventually reached a legislative compro-
mise in 1894, passing the unusual Mulct Law. While keeping 
prohibition on the books, it allowed merchants to sell liquor as 
long as they paid fines, or “mulct taxes,” for breaking the law. 
Prohibition remained the rule and violations the legal exception.8  
 In 1909 the General Assembly passed the Moon Law, 
named after its sponsor, Senator Edwin Moon. The act limited 
saloons to one for every 1,000 inhabitants in a community; 
towns of fewer than 1,000 were allowed a single seller, and, in 
communities with more than one already existing saloon per 
                                                 
6. Clark, “History of Liquor Legislation, 1861–1878,” 339–74; Dan Elbert Clark, 
“History of Liquor Legislation, 1878–1908,” Iowa Journal of History and Politics 6 
(1908), 503–608. To amend the Iowa Constitution, two consecutive sessions of 
the Iowa legislature must pass an amendment through both houses; then the 
amendment must be approved by Iowans in a popular vote. In this case, how-
ever, the 1882 session of the legislature passed a version of the prohibition 
amendment that omitted the phrase “or to be used” between “No person shall 
manufacture for sale, or sell, or keep for sale, as a beverage” and “any intoxi-
cating liquor whatever, including ale, wine and beer” that was in the 1880 
version. The courts ruled that passing two different wordings of the amend-
ment violated the process and tossed out the amendment. The courts also 
ruled that the Iowa House had not completely followed the rules in recording 
the amendment in its journal, making the amendment invalid.  
7. Clark, “History of Liquor Legislation, 1878–1908,” 503–608. 
8. Ibid. For a summary of the Iowa prohibition debate in the 1880s and ‘90s that 
includes ethnoreligious alignments, see Richard Jensen, “Iowa, Wet or Dry? 
Prohibition and the Fall of the GOP,” in Iowa History Reader, ed. Marvin Berg-
man (Iowa City, 1996), 263–90. 
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1,000 residents—mostly Iowa river towns—the law allowed 
those establishments to continue. As a result of the Moon Law, 
the number of Iowa businesses selling liquor was cut in half—
from 1,600 in 1908 to 740 in 1912. Another law passed in 1909 
made it unlawful for any person or corporation engaged in the 
“manufacture, brewing, distilling or refining of intoxicating 
liquors” to be involved, either directly or indirectly, in the retail 
liquor business.9  
 The Mulct Law lasted until 1915, when vital portions of it, 
such as those addressing payment and collection of the mulct tax, 
were repealed, effectively killing it. According to Clark, that 
move was a “spontaneous expression of the quiet convictions 
of the people of the State, rather than a response to an active, 
organized demand.” The prohibition statute, still on the books, 
remained state law and established policy, and the legislature 
increased penalties for violations, together with providing addi-
tional means for enforcement. This marked the third time in 
Iowa’s history that absolute prohibition of liquor was state law.10 
 The Iowa legislature passed another constitutional amend-
ment on prohibition in two sessions in 1915 and 1917, with a 
statewide vote set for October 15, 1917. This time, however, 
Iowans rejected placing prohibition into the constitution, voting 
down the effort by 932 votes among over 430,000 cast, the first 
time Iowans vetoed prohibition by popular vote. Soon, however, 
national prohibition became the law of the land with passage of 
the Eighteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.11 
 With the repeal of national prohibition in 1933—an action 
Iowans supported in a statewide popular vote on the federal 
Twenty-First Amendment, 377,275 to 249,943—state political 
leaders faced the challenge of responding to liquor use in Iowa 
in a post-prohibition age. The solution was the creation in 1934 
of an Iowa liquor monopoly, which sold—and controlled—
alcohol through state stores managed by the State Liquor Con-
trol Commission. The only alcohol Iowans could legally pur-
                                                 
9. Dan Elbert Clark, “Recent Liquor Legislation in Iowa,” Iowa Journal of History 
and Politics 15 (1917), 48–50.  
10. Ibid., 57–58.  
11. Edgar Rubey Harlan, A Narrative History of the People of Iowa, 5 vols. (Chica-
go, 1931), 2:274. 
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chase and possess was sold through the state stores. Iowans 
who wanted to buy liquor for consumption off the premises 
had to buy permits, and each purchase was registered with the 
state. Store managers held the right to refuse purchases to indi-
viduals they felt would abuse the privilege. (Prior to repeal, 
beer in Iowa was already legal and had a different distribution 
system. In early 1933 Congress passed legislation redefining 
“intoxicating” under the Eighteenth Amendment, stating that 
this did not include beer with a 3.2 percent alcohol content or 
less. Iowa lawmakers followed suit on April 15, approving the 
same definition on the state level for “beer, ale, porter, stout or 
any other malt liquor” and setting up regulatory guidelines for 
beer brewers, bottlers, wholesalers, and retailers. Retailers with 
state permits could sell beer in stores and serve it over the coun-
ter in glasses in establishments that became known in Iowa as 
“beer taverns.” By law, “intoxicating” liquor could not be sold in 
taverns; nor could it be found on the seller’s premises.)12  
 By the mid-1950s, some Iowans were clamoring for more 
liberalized liquor access laws, specifically the right to enjoy intox-
icating beverages outside the home with friends and neighbors 
at local venues. Iowa legislators acceded to this demand in 1955 
when they passed legislation allowing for “key clubs.” These 
establishments—social settings such as country clubs, VFWs, 
Elks clubs, American Legion halls, and others—were allowed to 
set up lockers where members could place bottles of alcohol 
purchased from the state liquor stores; each member was given 
a key to a locker and, when visiting, could take out bottles and 
consume alcohol on the premises. The establishment itself could 
not legally supply liquor, either by bottle or glass.13  
 By the early 1960s, the legal framework in Iowa for alcohol 
sales centered on the state liquor stores, which sold to Iowa citi-
zens; by that time, there were nearly 190 stores throughout Iowa. 
Liquor consumption was legally allowed in key clubs as long as 
the bottles were brought into clubs by consumers, not club 
managers or owners. Liquor by the drink—serving alcohol in 
                                                 
12. Leland Sage, A History of Iowa (Ames, 1974), 301–2; Daniel Okrent, Last Call: 
The Rise and Fall of Prohibition (New York, 2010), 352; 1933 Laws of Iowa, 53–62; 
1933–1934 Laws of Iowa, 38–60. 
13. 1955 Laws of Iowa, 108–9; Cedar Rapids Gazette, 12/26/1962.  
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glasses and charging for the service—was illegal in the state, 
although, by this time, it was legal in all states surrounding Iowa. 
Bills calling for legalizing liquor by the drink had been intro-
duced in nearly every session of the Iowa legislature in various 
forms since World War II, but was seriously debated only once: 
in 1961 a bill came to the floor of the Iowa House, was debated, 
and soundly defeated, 72–22.14 
 As most Iowans knew, however, the practices in their com-
munities did not reflect the laws on the books, which were 
commonly violated across the state. In 1962 the fiction of Iowa’s 
liquor laws was about to collide head-on with the reality of a 
heated gubernatorial campaign. 
 
ON SUNDAY MORNING, May 6, 1962, Iowans woke to read 
a banner headline in the Des Moines Sunday Register: “‘Liquor By 
Drink’ in 2/3 of Iowa!” According to a story written by Register 
reporter George Mills, assisted by a staff of reporters, liquor 
was sold by the drink in at least 66 of Iowa’s 99 counties, coun-
ties with 2.2 million of the state’s 2.8 million residents. Register 
reporters had combed the state to “make available the facts 
about liquor law observance in Iowa.” They found that “sale of 
liquor by the drink has been more or less commonplace in even 
small towns.” “In most county seats,” wrote one reporter, “you 
don’t need your own bottle. All you need is the money, and 
courage enough to walk into a club and ask for bourbon, after 
telling the bartender you are sick of beer.” In some cases, wrote 
Mills, local law enforcement officials did not “crack down” on 
violators because they believed a majority of citizens opposed 
enforcing the law or did not care one way or the other; those 
officials were often elected and re-elected several times. The 
Register listed a county-by-county summary of eastern Iowa 
counties, citing whether or not they offered illegal liquor sales; 
western counties were listed in a follow-up story a week later.15  
                                                 
14. Twenty-Eighth Annual Report of the Iowa Liquor Control Commission for Fiscal 
Year Ending June 30, 1962, p. 6; Cedar Rapids Gazette, 1/20/1963; Sioux City Jour-
nal, 12/8/1962.  
15. Des Moines Register, 5/6/62, 5/13/62. The Register reported that establish-
ments were not afraid of local or state crackdowns, but they were of federal 
law enforcement. Those selling liquor were required to buy a federal Retail Liq-
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 The defiance of the liquor-by-the-drink prohibition reflected 
public opinion in Iowa. In May 1962 the Des Moines Register re-
ported the results of an Iowa Poll: 55 percent of Iowans favored 
changing state laws so that liquor by the drink could be sold 
legally in Iowa; 37 percent were opposed. This public stance 
had not altered significantly in recent years; in a 1957 survey 54 
percent of Iowans had favored the practice, and 52 percent had 
in 1959. The 1962 poll showed that “city” residents strongly fa-
vored a change (62 percent), but only 42 percent of “farm” resi-
dents reacted positively; 52 percent of those in “towns” favored 
open liquor sales, with 41 percent opposed. Rural Iowans con-
sistently opposed liquor by the drink.16 
 The disparity between city and farm was part of the difficulty 
in translating popular will on the liquor issue into legislative 
change. The Iowa legislature was dominated by rural forces, set 
by a reapportionment plan established in 1904, when legislators 
passed a constitutional amendment creating a House with 108 
members, one from each of Iowa’s 99 counties, with an addition-
al member granted to each of the nine most populous counties. 
The 50-member Senate was apportioned by population, but in 
1928 another amendment prohibited counties from having 
more than one senator; even as counties with large urban popu-
lations grew in twentieth-century Iowa, their Senate representa-
tion was limited. Both chambers—but especially the House—
vastly underrepresented urban interests. For instance, by 1960, 
the six least populated counties (Adams, Ringgold, Clarke, Da-
vis, Van Buren, and Wayne) had a total of six members in the 
Iowa House, representing 52,377 people. The three most popu-
lous counties (Polk, Linn, and Black Hawk) also had six mem-
bers in the House, but they represented 525,696 Iowa citizens, 
nearly ten times the constituency of the bottom six counties. 
                                                                                                       
uor Dealer (RLD) stamp for $54 per year. Between July 1, 1961, and publication 
of the Register story, 1,784 privately operated Iowa establishments had bought 
RLD stamps. The maximum penalty for selling liquor without a federal stamp 
was two years in prison and a $5,000 fine. Those businesses had federal approval 
for an activity that was illegal in Iowa. The Register also pointed out that there 
were 4,700 taverns with Class B beer permits, allowing consumption of beer on 
the premises. Most of the managers of those taverns, claimed the reporters, did 
not sell liquor by the drink and opposed it, seeing it as competition for their 
businesses and putting them on the same side of the argument as the “drys.”  
16. Des Moines Register, 5/13/1962. 
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Urban legislators were simply vastly outnumbered by rural leg-
islators in the Iowa House. Given that liquor by the drink tradi-
tionally had low support among rural Iowans, the construction 
of the Iowa legislature was a high hurdle for those supporting a 
loosening of Iowa liquor laws.17 
 In the early 1960s, the Iowa Republican Party dominated the 
state legislature; in the 1961 session of the General Assembly 78 
of 108 seats in the House and 35 of 50 seats in the Senate were 
Republican. The party’s establishment was traditionally hesi-
tant to change liquor laws—at least according to its statewide 
public pronouncements. When Iowa Republicans met at Veter-
ans Auditorium in Des Moines on July 20, 1962, to pass a plat-
form and mark the beginning of the campaign for state offices, 
Iowa GOP members voted simply to study the issue of liquor 
by the drink, urging the legislature to undertake a “re-evaluation 
and re-approval” of the “present liquor control act.”18 
 
THE IOWA DEMOCRATIC CANDIDATE for governor, 
Harold E. Hughes, did not share that attitude. He supported 
legalizing liquor by the drink. Born in 1922 in the small western 
Iowa town of Ida Grove, Hughes was a star high school athlete; 
he won the state discus championship in 1938 and was selected 
as all-state football guard in 1939. He attended the University of 
Iowa for a year and played on its football team. Marrying Ida 
Grove native Eva Mercer in 1941, he dropped out of college and 
worked a series of jobs until he was drafted into the military 
during World War II. He fought in the battle to take Sicily and 
Salerno in Italy in 1943. After military service, he returned to 
Ida Grove, where he got a job driving trucks; he then managed 
Hinrichs Truck Line in Ida Grove and later worked as a field rep-
resentative for the Iowa Motor Truck Association. Dissatisfied 
with the low rates independent truckers were getting for hauling 
freight, he organized them into the Iowa Better Trucking Bureau. 
                                                 
17. Charles Wiggins, “The Post World War II Legislative Reapportionment 
Battle in Iowa Politics,” in Patterns and Perspectives in Iowa History, ed. Dorothy 
Schwieder (Ames, 1973), 403–430; Iowa Official Register, 1963–1964 (Des Moines, 
1964), 303–4. 
18. Des Moines Register, 7/21/1962; Iowa Official Register, 1961–1962 (Des Moines, 
1962), 96. 
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As the head of the bureau, he butted heads with members of the 
Iowa State Commerce Commission. In 1958 he ran for one of 
the three statewide commission posts and was elected. Initially 
a Republican, Hughes grew disenchanted with the party’s con-
servatism and became a Democrat prior to his election as com-
missioner. He ran for governor simply because he thought he 
could do a better job than any other candidate running. He lost 
the primary on his first try in 1960 but won in 1962.19 
 To those who supported him in his race for governor in 
1962, Hughes was a magnetic personality who often acted in 
ways contrary to those of a traditional politician, frequently 
forceful, charismatic, and direct. He was initially an awkward 
candidate, uncomfortable with small talk and light chatter. As 
he said, “I don’t run up and down the street shaking hands be-
cause I don’t believe it does much good.” He was much more 
comfortable directly addressing the issues in blunt, stark terms 
in his speeches and conversations. A large man, 6’2” tall, 
Hughes was handsome with a full head of dark hair. One of his 
strengths was his personal delivery: his deep, baritone voice 
commanded attention. According to longtime Des Moines Regis-
ter political journalist James Flansburg, Hughes delivered “the 
most telling and moving oratory I’ve ever heard.”20  
 Hughes was also a deeply religious man. He experienced a 
“born-again” Christian spiritual transformation in 1952 when in 
the depths of personal despair. His desolation rose from a serious 
problem with alcoholism that almost destroyed his marriage 
and led him to the brink of suicide. Following a drinking binge 
after his wife and daughters had left him, he sat in his bathtub 
with a gun in his mouth, ready to pull the trigger, when, he later 
claimed, he had a religious experience. At that point, he vowed  
                                                 
19. For Hughes’s personal story, see his autobiography, Harold Hughes with 
Dick Schneider, Harold E. Hughes: The Man from Ida Grove: A Senator’s Personal 
Story (Lincoln, VA, 1979). As the title suggests, much of the narrative centers on 
Hughes as a person, especially the impact of his Christian faith on his life, rather 
than on politics. For a more expansive outlook on Hughes and Iowa politics, as 
well as the impact of his dynamic personality, see Jim C. Larew, A Party Reborn: 
The Democrats of Iowa, 1950–1974 (Iowa City, 1980), especially the chapter on 
Hughes, “The Democrats Reborn: The Rise of Harold Hughes,” pp. 73–126.   
20. Iowa Official Register, 1962–1963 (Des Moines, 1964), 4; Des Moines Register, 
10/7/1962, 11/7/1962; New York Times, 10/25/1996. 
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to give up alcohol, sought help, and became intensely involved 
in the Methodist church, even volunteering as a Sunday school 
teacher. Hughes was open about his alcoholic past, discussing it 
freely when asked about it on the campaign trail. He was care-
ful to say that he was a recovering alcoholic, not a cured one.21 
 Soon after the Des Moines Register exposé on statewide liquor-
by-the-drink violations and after several weeks of careful study, 
Hughes announced that he backed legalization. Accepting the 
Democratic nomination at the State Democratic Convention on 
July 28, 1962, he called it a moral issue. 
It is a moral issue because it involves an issue of official hypocrisy 
that shames the entire state. The real issue is not whether or not 
we shall have “liquor-by-the-drink” in Iowa. Let’s face it. You 
                                                 
21. Hughes, Harold E. Hughes, 102–9; Cedar Rapids Gazette, 11/7/1962; Des 
Moines Register, 10/7/1962. 
 
Harold Hughes (1922–1996), Iowa governor, 
1963–1969. Photo from State Historical Society 
of Iowa (SHSI), Iowa City. 
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know and I know and every honest person in Iowa knows that we 
have liquor-by-the-drink in this state now. . . . The moral issue, 
then, is: Shall we straight-forwardly legalize the sale of liquor-by-
the-drink, enforce the law and really control the liquor traffic in 
this state? Or shall we perpetuate the present wide-open key club 
system that subsidizes the bootleggers and racketeers with reve-
nues that rightfully belong to the taxpayers of Iowa?22 
 Hughes also attacked the incumbent governor for mishan-
dling the state budget, allowing a $46 million surplus inherited 
from the prior administration to shrink to $18 million. Citing 
capital improvement needs throughout the state, Hughes pro-
posed raising new revenues to meet those needs and to provide 
for property tax reform to relieve those stressed on the local 
level. Looking forward to an aggressive fall campaign, Hughes 
said, “What can happen in these three months can shake this 
state out of its coma as it has never been shaken before and get 
it on the forward move again.”23   
 
OPPOSING HUGHES was the incumbent Republican governor, 
Norman Erbe of Boone, running for his second two-year term. 
The youngest of six children of a Boone Lutheran minister, Erbe 
had served on 35 combat missions with the Eighth Air Force dur-
ing World War II and was awarded the Distinguished Flying 
Cross and four air medals. After earning a law degree from the 
University of Iowa in 1947, he practiced law in Boone, served as 
county attorney, and chaired the Boone County Republican Party 
from 1952 to 1956. Elected Iowa attorney general in 1956, Erbe 
gained a second term by little more than 2,000 votes two years 
later. On September 1, 1959, he sought to raise his statewide pro-
file by reaching back to an 1886 Iowa law and announcing that 
he was banning 42 “girlie” magazines as obscene literature. The 
action did little to actually change magazine availability, but the 
controversy and publicity helped Erbe win a close GOP guberna-
torial primary in 1960, and in November he was elected governor.  
                                                 
22. Cedar Rapids Gazette, 11/8/62; “Press Release for Democratic Fund Raising 
Dinner, Newton,” 5/26/1962, Press Releases 1962, box 25, HEH Papers; “State 
Democratic Convention, July 28, 1962,” Speeches—July–Sept. 1962, box 27, 
HEH Papers. 
23. Ibid. 
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 Erbe’s strategy during his re-election bid in 1962 was to avoid 
making waves. The Iowa legislature, not the governor, he argued, 
makes the laws. “I don’t want to come out whole hog for this 
position or that if it doesn’t materialize in the Legislature, “he 
said. “There’s no use doing this unless you know you have the 
votes. . . . My concept of the governorship is that of an adminis-
trator and executive through persuasion. In our weak governor 
system, it’s impossible for the governor to impress his will if the 
Legislature or government departments don’t want to follow.” 
Erbe said that the liquor-by-the-drink issue was up to the Iowa 
General Assembly; he wasn’t going to push the issue. He claimed 
to be guided by the state Republican platform, which only said 
that the issue should be “studied.” He refused to go further 
than that.24  
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 As the campaign progressed, this conservative stance seemed 
a safe bet for Erbe. In the first poll on the race conducted by the 
Des Moines Register and released on October 7, Erbe led Hughes, 
49 to 42 percent, with the rest undecided. Among “city” voters, 
Erbe led 46 to 44; among “town,” 50 to 41; and among “coun-
try,” 53 to 38. However, the polling numbers included an omi-
nous sign for the Erbe campaign: when Iowans were asked who 
would do the best job on “liquor,” Hughes led 46 to 30 percent.25 
 There were indications around the state that opinion on the 
liquor-by-the-drink issue was divided along urban/rural rather 
than partisan lines. At the Polk County Republican Party conven-
tion, delegates representing the most populous county in the 
state passed a resolution in favor of liquor by the drink under 
strict regulation. The resolution “deplored” the “almost complete 
disregard of the present Iowa liquor laws which permit the oper-
ation of phony key clubs.” County Republican meetings in Pot-
tawattamie and Des Moines counties approved similar planks.26  
 Among the businesses at the forefront of the issue—restau-
rant owners—the consensus was that it was time for a change, 
according to Register reporter Nick Lamberto, covering the an-
nual meeting of the Iowa Restaurant Association in Des Moines. 
Ermol Loghry of Iowa City, newly elected treasurer of the or-
ganization, said, “The way we’re bringing up children now to 
wink at the law is not right. . . . We’ve had 30 years of handling 
liquor the way it is now. Thirty years is long enough to see if it 
can be enforced.” Others at the meeting said it was unfair to 
businesses close to the rivers on either side of the state because 
those in Nebraska and Illinois could serve liquor legally.27  
 Hughes aggressively raised the issue everywhere he spoke 
around the state during the 1962 fall campaign. In Erbe’s home 
                                                                                                       
several other Iowa state executive posts elected independently of the governor. 
These included, at the time, the lieutenant governor, the attorney general, the 
secretary of state, the state treasurer, the state auditor, and the secretary of agri-
culture. The Iowa Constitution would later be amended to allow a gubernatorial 
candidate to select, with the consent of the party convention, a lieutenant gov-
ernor candidate who would serve if elected.  
25. Des Moines Register, 10/7/1962.  
26. Des Moines Register, 6/30/1962, 7/3/1962. 
27. Des Moines Register, 10/16/1962.  
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town of Boone, Hughes asked, “Why hasn’t Mr. Erbe done any-
thing about the shocking statewide, open violations of the state 
liquor control laws?” In Davenport, he said, “Since we have it 
[liquor] anyway, why not have the profits go to the taxpayers?” 
Estimating that legalization could bring in as much as $15 mil-
lion per year, Hughes argued that the revenue could be put to 
good use for state capital improvements, though he was careful 
to say that the issue was one of respect for law, not revenue en-
hancement. “To restore respect for our laws is our first objec-
tive. The revenue issue is secondary—but it is nonetheless im-
portant and worth considering.” Addressing “drys,” Hughes 
argued,  
Many good temperance people frown upon liquor tax revenue as 
being ‘tainted’ money. I appreciate the sincerity of their viewpoints 
but it is high time we faced realities. The state is already in the liq-
uor business through package sales in the state stores. The state tax 
commission—amazingly enough—admits that it collects some sales 
tax revenue from illegal liquor-by-the-drink sales in key clubs! If 
the revenue is tainted, we are already tainted. Moreover, the full 
measure of revenues from taxing by-the-glass should go to the 
taxpayers to whom such revenues rightfully belong, rather than 
largely bootleggers and racketeers as is the case at the present time. 
As governor, Hughes pledged on October 3 in a front-page Reg-
ister story, he would enforce the current law prohibiting liquor-
by-the-drink sales “whether the law is changed or not.”28  
 Recognition of the need for additional state revenue arose 
when the Des Moines Register interviewed members of the bipar-
tisan Iowa Legislative Revenue Study Committee and reported 
the group’s consensus that $30 million was needed just to main-
tain present expenditures and the current rate of development 
at the state colleges. Additional funds would also be needed for 
proposed property tax relief. This further raised the profile of 
revenue from liquor sales that Hughes continued to stress. He 
added that he would urge a combination of sources—increased 
sales tax, a broadened sales tax, or increased state income tax—
to meet the state’s needs. Erbe’s response was that he would not 
                                                 
28. “Remarks at Boone, Iowa, Sept. 1, 1962,” Speeches July–Sept., 1962, box 27, 
HEH Papers; Des Moines Register, 10/3/1962, 10/13/1962, 10/30/1962.  
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make any recommendations until after the committee made its 
final report, which would be after the election. Hughes accused 
Erbe of using that to duck the issue.29  
 Calling Erbe “the Great Vacillator,” Hughes pounded his 
opponent for not generating a plan for property tax relief or 
enforcing the state’s liquor laws. Speaking in Denison, Hughes 
blamed Erbe for the problem. “The plain facts are that as gover-
nor . . . and as attorney general for years, he himself is more re-
sponsible than anyone else for the wide-open illegal liquor traffic 
in this state that corrupts our young people and makes a mock-
ery of our laws.” Hughes scoffed at Erbe’s argument that Iowa’s 
“weak governor” system made the governor answerable to the 
legislature, calling it a “curious spineless concept of the gover-
nor’s role.” “The executive branch has always had the necessary 
authority—and the responsibility—to enforce the law,” Hughes 
claimed. “As usual, Mr. Erbe passes the buck on liquor law 
enforcement to the legislature—but this is an absurd excuse. 
Under our system, the legislature makes the laws; the executive 
branch is supposed to carry them out. The weakness in the 
‘weak governor’ system is Mr. Erbe himself.”30  
 As the campaign moved on, several “dry” supporters saw 
the climate beginning to change and concluded that they needed 
to take a stand in the debate. In late October, the Greater Des 
Moines Evangelical Ministers Association passed a resolution 
opposing liquor by the drink. The group, representing 50 Des 
Moines churches, argued that “alcohol-caused expenses will cost 
a state from $1.33 to $5.75 for every dollar collected on liquor 
tax” and that, among the six surrounding states with liquor by 
the drink, “liquor consumption is more than 47 percent higher 
than in Iowa.” On October 21, the Temperance Legislative Coun-
cil, a lobbying group with members from the Iowa WCTU, the 
Iowa Temperance League, and the Iowa Council of Churches, 
announced its support for Erbe. Responding to potential oppo-
sition to his position from church pulpits, the Hughes campaign 
                                                 
29. Des Moines Register, 9/16/1962, 9/26/1962.  
30. “Press release, Oct. 2, 1962, speaking at a Democratic barbeque in Denison,” 
Press Releases 1962, box 25, HEH Papers; “Press release on speech in Fort 
Dodge on Oct. 15, 1962,” Press Releases 1962, box 25, HEH Papers; Des Moines 
Register, 10/3/1962.  
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in October sent a letter signed by the candidate to more than 
1,000 Iowa clergy, explaining his stand on liquor by the drink. 
Addressing the “thousands of good people who oppose any 
change in the liquor laws because of temperance convictions,” 
Hughes wrote that his advocacy of liquor by the drink is not 
“simply another chapter in the wet-dry issue. It isn’t. It is an 
issue of law and order over crime and confusion. It is an issue 
of honesty over hypocrisy.” More directly, Hughes said in a 
speech in Corning, “It is time that the temperance people in 
Iowa opened their eyes and looked at reality.”31  
 With the campaign moving into its final month, Erbe 
stressed that it was important for Iowans to elect a Republican 
governor to work effectively with an overwhelmingly Republi-
can legislature. Erbe argued that Hughes was irresponsibly 
overestimating the role of a governor in the legislative process. 
“Any candidate who says his election will mean any bill will be 
passed is being considerably less than honest with the voters,” 
he said in Harlan. “The lawmaking rights of our state are only 
within the domain of the legislature.” Hughes responded that 
Erbe was taking credit for past legislation while claiming that 
he could not influence legislation in the future.32 
 In a mailing to the state’s 945 Iowa mayors that was widely 
publicized in the Iowa media, the Hughes campaign pointed 
out that per capita liquor sales in state stores were substantially 
lower in most of the state’s eastern and western border counties 
than in interior counties (where the average was $20.80 versus 
$14.56 in the eastern counties and $11.99 in the west). The point 
was that substantial quantities of liquor were brought illegally 
into Iowa from neighboring states to serve the liquor-by-the-
drink market. Iowa counties and towns were not getting that 
revenue from state liquor stores. “Iowa should either get out of 
the liquor business or get into it right,” Hughes said, adding 
that “cities, towns and counties should share in these extra mo-
nopoly store profits and in license fees.”33  
                                                 
31. Des Moines Register, 10/17/1962, 10/21/1962, 10/27/1962; “Press release 
on speech in Corning, Oct. 23, 1962,” Press Releases 1962, box 25, HEH Papers. 
32. Des Moines Register, 11/1/1962, 11/2/1962, 11/3/1962; Cedar Rapids Gazette, 
11/2/1962.  
33. Des Moines Register, 11/2/1962; Cedar Rapids Gazette, 11/2/1962. 
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 Erbe obtained the Des Moines Register’s endorsement on Oc-
tober 28. Its editorial writers believed that the incumbent could 
get more done because Republicans dominated the legislature, 
which would block efforts supported by Hughes. Other news-
papers supported Hughes. The Davenport Morning Democrat 
noted that “he faces the facts realistically” and “has shown the 
kind of courage and clarity of thinking as a candidate that 
would make him a good governor.”34 
 Beneath the editorials and headlines, Hughes appeared to 
be making inroads, even among those who disagreed with him. 
Harry Beardsley of West Des Moines wrote in a letter to the edi-
tor in the Des Moines Register that even though he opposed liq-
uor by the drink, “I respect Harold Hughes for the intelligence 
and integrity he has shown in trying to think honestly about 
the liquor problem, and for his willingness to state clearly, un-
equivocally and forthrightly what he believes should be done 
about it.” The final opinion poll issued by the Des Moines Register 
the weekend before the election showed Hughes behind but 
gaining. Erbe had a narrowing 52–48 percent lead among those 
already decided; the two were tied among city voters, 46–46, 
with Erbe showing a lead among “town” and “farm” voters.35 
 The result on election day—November 6, 1962—was a solid 
victory for Hughes over Erbe, 430,899 to 388,602. In the lightest 
voter turnout since 1946, Hughes cruised to victory by carrying 
Iowa’s population centers, including Polk County, by more than 
23,000 votes, accounting for more than half his victory margin. 
Among the five counties with populations above 100,000, 
Hughes carried all but one (Scott County) and won seven of the 
top 10 counties and 14 of the top 20. The victory was personal 
for Hughes; all the other statewide elected officers were Repub-
lican, prompting Des Moines Register editorial cartoonist Frank 
Miller to draw a state banquet table with a large donkey, grinning   
broadly at the center, surrounded by smaller, grumpy, and irri-
tated elephants.36  
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 The banner headline in the Cedar Rapids Gazette after the elec-
tion was “Hughes—Liquor Mandate.” That immediate judgment 
may have been too simplistic, however. If some assumed that 
voters in border counties wanted liquor by the drink because 
they were next to states that had it, the evidence is not there. 
Only 9 of the 36 border counties and only 12 of the 19 river 
counties (next to the Missouri and Mississippi rivers) gave 
Hughes a plurality. One commentator, Frank Nye of the Cedar 
Rapids Gazette, wrote that many in the river cities did not want 
legalized liquor by the drink “since this would mean operators 
now paying no license fee would have to do so under almost 
any kind of legalizing act passed by the legislature.” Many, in-
cluding Hughes, said that he won the election because he took a 
strong stand on issues—certainly on liquor, but also on property 
 
Frank Miller cartoon from the Des Moines Regis-
ter, November 8, 1962, in response to the election 
of Republicans to all statewide offices except the 
Democratic governor. 
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tax relief, the need for capital improvements and other concerns. 
“We won because we had a program,” said Hughes, “and be-
cause a majority of the voters believe that we had every inten-
tion of putting this program into effect, if elected.” He added, 
“The liquor issue was to our campaign what a tail is to a dog. 
The tail is an important part of the dog, but the tail does not 
wag the dog—it is the other way around.”37  
 Another important factor in Hughes’s win was a strong 
Democratic organization, especially in urban areas. Democratic 
State Chairman Lex Hawkins, a young, energetic Des Moines 
attorney elected in 1962, helped build the party, especially in 
the more populous counties, and improved the party’s finances 
to get out the vote. In Polk County alone, Democrats moved 
from matching Republicans in party registration to having a 
7,000 voter lead in 1962. Democratic Party workers in the larger 
counties were seen out at 6 a.m., getting supporters to the polls. 
Also, by the early 1960s the Iowa Democratic Party had cemented 
an expanding political relationship with organized labor that 
brought more working class voters to the party; in 1962, Demo-
crats worked with labor leaders close to the election to register 
union members in 16 Iowa cities and get them to the polls on 
election day. In the other campaign, Erbe ran a lackluster effort, 
refusing to take a solid position on liquor by the drink and other 
significant issues, earning the wrath of Hughes’s rhetoric and 
giving potential supporters few reasons to enthusiastically back 
the incumbent. Nevertheless, the consensus among state opinion 
makers was that Hughes’s election had shifted the liquor-by-
the-drink debate by placing in the governor’s chair a strong, 
forceful proponent.38  
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THE NEW DEMOCRATIC GOVERNOR, however, faced a 
Republican-dominated Iowa legislature that—at least on the sur-
face—looked like it would present a significant challenge to pass-
ing a liquor-by-the-drink law. At the same time as they elected 
Hughes as governor, Iowa voters gave the GOP 78 of 108 Iowa 
House seats—all elected in 1962—and 19 of the 27 Senate seats at 
stake, giving Republicans a 38–12 Senate majority. Most political 
commentators believed that the liquor legislation would be much 
tougher to pass in the House, with its overwhelmingly rural 
makeup, than in the Senate. Some, such as the Sioux City Journal, 
doubted that much could be done from the governor’s chair. 
“As governor, Mr. Hughes will be unable to push any legislation 
through the legislature, including his promise of liquor-by-the-
drink for Iowa. This always has been a legislative decision. No 
governor can do much about it, even if he so desires.” In mid-
January 1963 Des Moines Register reporter Nick Kotz estimated 
that the Senate had a majority ready to pass liquor by the drink, 
but the House, at that time, was about ten votes short of passage. 
Former Speaker of the House Henry C. Nelson (R-Forest City), 
who was not a candidate for the office in 1963, came out strongly 
against liquor by the drink, saying that “just because there are 
widespread violations of the present law” is not an argument for 
legalization. Comparing it to speeding on the highways, he said, 
“There are many violations of those laws also.”39  
 But attitudes were starting to change, even before the legis-
lature met in January 1963. The most significant shifts were in 
                                                                                                       
hoping to make the General Assembly more representative of urban popula-
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the Iowa Republican Party itself. In a secret poll taken for the 
Republican Party in the fall of 1962 by Central Survey, Inc., of 
Shenandoah, 63 percent of Iowans favored liquor sales, with 
only 30 percent opposed; even Republicans favored it 49 per-
cent to 45 percent. Facing such stark numbers, on December 10, 
1962, Republican Party State Chairman George Nagle of Iowa 
City publicly endorsed passage of liquor-by-the-drink legisla-
tion and convinced the Republican State Central Committee to 
also support the effort, although the vote was not unanimous. 
Nagle realized that opposition to this reform was becoming an 
albatross around the neck of the Iowa GOP, and he wanted it 
removed as soon as possible. That attitude was becoming widely 
shared throughout the state party. In a survey conducted by the 
Iowa Daily Press Association among Iowa Republican Party 
chairmen and vice-chairmen in early 1963, 60 percent of the 75 
leaders contacted favored liquor by the drink, as long as it had 
stringent enforcement provisions. One respondent was quoted as 
saying, “Don’t repudiate city Republicans or our party is dead.” 
Even the leader of the Republicans in the fall campaign—
Governor Norman Erbe—had a change of heart and threw his 
support to the effort. In a newspaper interview after the election, 
Erbe said that he “personally felt there should be some liquor-
by-the-drink system in Iowa” and, if he had to do it over again, 
he would have supported reform. He said he had refrained 
from doing so in the campaign because felt bound by the GOP 
platform, which only called for review of liquor laws.40 
 Newspapers around the state, taking the election of Hughes 
as an indication that Iowans wanted liquor by the drink legal-
ized, supported change—as well as Hughes’s pledge to enforce 
current law until it was changed. The Burlington Hawkeye wrote, 
“A principal reason Iowa has never become serious about chang-
ing its laws is that most areas already have liquor by the drink, so 
why stir it up? If most areas suddenly do not have liquor by the 
drink, the demand for a legislative change could well be so loud 
it will even penetrate the dense ears of the legislators.” Others 
noted that increased state revenue would accompany legaliza-
tion and that this was changing the minds of many “drys.” 
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According to the Davenport Morning Democrat, “Many who do 
not favor liquor itself under any circumstance have nevertheless 
been won over to the idea [that] since we actually have liquor 
by the drink in much of Iowa, the state should be collecting rev-
enue from it.”41 
 
THE MAN at the center of the effort immediately showed that 
he meant what he said in the campaign about enforcing current 
law. At a victory celebration in mid-November in Ida Grove, 
Hughes declared, “I hope illegal sale of liquor comes to a stop 
before I become governor. It will make things simpler for every-
body if that happens.” During a press conference in Des Moines 
in early December, Hughes called on sheriffs and county attor-
neys to start enforcing the law on liquor. If they did that, he said, 
it would not be necessary to use state officers for that purpose 
after his inauguration on January 17, 1963. In a meeting with leg-
islative Democrats the same day, he met some opposition to strict 
enforcement, but he made it clear that he was not changing his 
mind: “They might as well go home and make peace with their 
constituents.” The strategy—and the gamble that Hughes was 
taking—was to make legislators see that the current liquor law, 
when enforced, was unpopular, thus putting pressure on them 
to change it.42  
 Others in state government began altering their tone. For-
merly lukewarm about liquor law enforcement during his first 
term, Iowa Attorney General Evan Hultman, a recently re-
elected Republican, addressed county attorneys on November 
16 in Cedar Rapids and urged them to cooperate with Hughes if 
he sought to enforce the liquor laws. Hultman said that he was 
prepared to give his support and hoped the county attorneys 
would do so as well. Later in November Hultman announced 
that he was forming a 15-member state crime council, composed 
of state and local officials, to work out uniform enforcement of 
Iowa’s present liquor laws and other statewide crime problems. 
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The prime focus, he said, was enforcing the state’s liquor-by-
the-drink laws.43  
 On December 10, Iowa Safety Commissioner Carl Pesch, an-
ticipating an order from Hughes to crack down on illegal liquor 
traffic, announced that he was ordering 27 state agents into train-
ing. The agents included 17 from the State Bureau of Criminal 
Investigation and 10 from the auto dealer, license, and motor 
vehicle registration division who would be diverted from their 
primary duties to enforcing liquor laws. Creating what he called 
“liquor law schools,” Pesch said the agents in the State Depart-
ment of Public Safety would receive refresher courses in raiding 
techniques, search and seizure, preservation of evidence, and 
other subjects related to liquor law enforcement. He said he was 
“certainly aware that new and novel responsibilities soon may 
be thrust upon this department,” adding that this could force “a 
drastic and irreversible change in the philosophy and mechanics 
of all law enforcement in Iowa.” This was not his preference, he 
noted, but “my personal opinion is not pertinent.”44 
 Hughes made the effort official on January 3 when he ap-
peared at a Des Moines press conference with Pesch to an-
nounce a statewide crackdown on illegal liquor sales. The Des 
Moines Register headlined the story, “Hughes Set to ‘Dry Up’ 
Iowa.” The governor-elect said that he hoped he would not have 
to use state forces; he would prefer that local law enforcement 
bodies make sure that businesses complied with current law. “I 
believe that adequate warning has been given that I expected 
voluntary enforcement before taking office,” he said. “And we 
are not going to wait two months and see what the legislature 
will do with the liquor laws.”45  
 The effect was immediate around the state. According to an 
investigation by the Des Moines Register, many tavern and club 
operators, especially in the river cities, voluntarily stopped sell-
ing liquor by the drink, fearful of prosecution by either local or 
state officials. Linn County Attorney Jack Fulton reported, “I 
understand that it has been very difficult to buy a drink in Cedar 
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Rapids and Linn County.” Tamiel Bleyart, a Davenport tavern 
operator who said he spoke for others in his business, said that 
most operators had agreed to “call things to a halt” before 
Hughes took office. Requests for a mixed drink at Council Bluffs 
water places drew a “sorry, no more” from the bartender. Louis 
Meyer, president of the Dubuque Tavern Keepers Association, 
claimed that the loss of over-the-counter liquor sales would put 
about 200 people out of work in the county.46  
 For the most part, the “drying” of Iowa came through vol-
untary action or from warnings by local law enforcement. In 
Fort Madison, tavern owners were called to City Hall and ad-
vised that “if they had illegal liquor to get rid of it,” said Police 
Chief Richard Peak, who called the town “drier than a bone.” 
Muscatine Police Chief Clifford Bennett reported that “almost 
all of the liquor is gone from Muscatine and all of it will be gone 
when Hughes becomes governor”; he said he had made it 
known that the laws would be enforced and that plain-clothes 
police officers would make periodic liquor checks. In Clinton 
most taverns stopped serving liquor in early January, said 
Police Chief M. H. Etherton, who added that two liquor raids 
at that time “gave some impetus” to the dry-up. Davenport’s 
tavern owners reached a “gentlemen’s agreement,” informally 
binding them to serve the last shot of liquor the evening of 
Saturday, January 13; the agreement was preceded by a well-
publicized promise by the Scott County attorney and sheriff to 
fully cooperate with state authorities to shut down the illegal 
liquor trade there.47  
 One clear sign that the change was real came with a drop in 
sales at the state liquor stores in traditionally “wet” counties on 
Iowa’s eastern and western borders. Merchants selling illegal 
liquor by the drink had purchased some product from Iowa 
state stores—despite statistics from the Hughes campaign 
showing that some alcohol came from outside the state—and, 
when that stopped, sales fell. Purchases at state stores for Janu-
ary 5–11 in Davenport, Dubuque, Bettendorf, and Council Bluffs 
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were estimated at 50 percent below the same week a year earlier. 
In Sioux City, Fort Dodge, and Carroll, sales were down by 
several thousand dollars compared to a year earlier. Sales were 
about the same or off only slightly in major stores in Cedar Rap-
ids, Waterloo, and Des Moines. “There is little doubt that the 
sales falloff is a result of Governor-elect Harold Hughes’s warn-
ing that illegal liquor sales must stop,” said Homer Adcock, who 
chaired the Iowa Liquor Control Commission. A week later, 
the commission reported that statewide liquor sales had fallen 
$85,000 from the previous year and, the next week, had plunged 
$100,000.48 
 Most merchants voluntarily ended over-the-counter liquor 
sales, but they did not see this as a permanent condition. Most 
accepted the halt of liquor sales as temporary, seeing it as put-
ting pressure on the legislature to change the law. Some said 
that the pause would last only until state agents demonstrated 
their course of action or lack of action. Ben Thomas, president of 
the Tavern Owners Association in Clinton, commented, “How 
long it will last, I don’t know. The dry-up is to show Hughes we 
are willing to co-operate. We want liquor by the drink.” “I’m 
interested in seeing what’s going to happen if the legislature 
ditches liquor by the drink,” said Carroll County Attorney Rob-
ert Bruner. “I personally think this will last as long as the gov-
ernor maintains his stiff attitude.”49 
 One reason many saw this as temporary is that merchants 
could not sustain the serious income losses they were suffering. 
“Our loss will be tremendous,” reported Robert Rosenthal, 
manager of Cedar Rapids Elks Lodge 251, which had removed 
all liquor from its bar. The owner of a leading bar in Sioux City 
said restaurant business had fallen sharply there and was going 
to South Sioux City, Nebraska. He added, “They think they’ve 
got a gold mine now.” Some establishments in Sioux City closed 
because they simply could not do business. By early February 
in the western Iowa city, many bartenders and waitresses were 
laid off, and meat and food sales to restaurants were below 
normal. Sioux City Councilman Julian Torgerson said that 11 
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conventions had either cancelled in Sioux City or moved across 
the river to South Sioux City. In Dubuque, city officials estimated 
that enforcement was costing the city a $1 million drop in busi-
ness, a $200,000 loss in wages, and $40,000 less in taxes for the 
city. The economic impact of enforcing the liquor-by-the-drink 
prohibition was real, significant, and affecting the lives of Iowans. 
In Davenport, Scott County Attorney Martin Lear said that by 
late January he had received no complaints of liquor being sold 
in bars—“not even any anonymous letters.” According to one 
Davenport tavern owner, “Business is lousy. I couldn’t sell 
enough beer to even pay my help.” Some city tavern owners 
increased the price of draft beer from 15 to 20 cents simply to 
make ends meet. A number of Davenport taverns closed before 
midnight due to lack of business.50 
 After Hughes took office as governor on January 17, 1963, 
he formally launched his effort to clamp down on illegal liquor 
sales. After a week on the job, the governor met with Attorney 
General Hultman and, in a joint news conference, Hultman 
pledged his full support to Hughes in state enforcement of liq-
uor laws. The attorney general said his role would be to give 
county attorneys a firm policy statement on liquor enforcement 
and handle relations with them on execution.51  
 By the end of January, according to a report submitted to 
Governor Hughes, state undercover agents had investigated 63 
taverns and clubs throughout Iowa over seven days and found 
no liquor for sale by the drink. Nevertheless, some still had not 
gotten the word, and the governor’s office was working behind 
the scenes to stamp out violations. Hughes and his aides re-
ceived several communications from Iowans, alerting them to 
operators still selling illegal liquor. Dwight Jensen, executive 
assistant to Hughes, received an unsigned letter on February 4, 
stating, “A good time to check on Phillis Tavern on Locust 
Street in Carter Lake, Iowa would be next Tuesday.” Jensen 
passed the letter on to Carl Pesch. On the same day, Jensen sent 
another letter to Pesch, describing a phone call he had received 
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from Elma Deacon of Bernard, Iowa, on sales at the Laverne 
Klocker establishment: “Mrs. Deacon reports the following: 
They are still selling liquor there. It has not stopped one bit. 
They have minors behind the bar serving liquor. Sometimes 
they don’t close until 1:30 on Sunday mornings. And, they have 
poker games every Saturday night. They keep liquor in a tool 
shed right outside the door and I think it’s time something is 
done about it.” Jensen added, “Would you please have this in-
vestigated?”52  
 Hughes himself contributed to this surreptitious assistance 
to law enforcement. In mid-February the governor related to 
Pesch a conversation he had had with Cresco Mayor Frank 
Church discussing a “liquor control problem in this town that 
he cannot solve and asked assistance from State Agents.” The 
mayor told Hughes that “local authorities are thwarted by polit-
ical strife between county and city officials.” “He added that his 
visit to Des Moines was known by several people in the town. 
For these reasons, he advises waiting about three weeks before 
sending a man in.” Hughes also conveyed to Pesch correspond-
ence he had received from a source on the Midwest Tavern in 
Davenport: “My informant says that the best time to investigate 
this situation is around 3:00 p.m. on Friday afternoon.” Later, the 
governor wrote to Pesch, “We have received information that 
Davenport is far from dry. The source of our information says 
that Davenport is 90% open on liquor, that bartenders are mix-
ing drinks in Coke and 7-Up bottles and pouring liquor from 
pitchers kept under the bar, and that he would like to see some 
action.” Still other letters from Hughes mentioned violations in 
Remsen, Merrill, and Hilton.53  
 The administration turned its words to action on both sides 
of the state beginning the evening of February 28. In Davenport, 
three state agents, together with local police, raided the Tip-
topper Tavern, arresting owner Chester Bowes, confiscating 18 
bottles of liquor and charging Bowes with possessing liquor on 
premises with a beer permit. The state agents had checked 15 
                                                 
52. Des Moines Register, 1/31/1963; Letters, 2/4/1963, Liquor Control Com-
mission, 1963–1964, 1967, box 9, HEH Papers.  
53. Hughes to Pesch, 2/12/1963, 2/19/1963, 2/20/1963, Liquor Control Com-
mission, 1963–1964, 1967, box 9, HEH Papers.  
30      THE ANNALS OF IOWA 
taverns and clubs in Davenport that day and raided the Tip-
topper Tavern after they were able to purchase liquor there. 
Early in the morning of March 1, 35 officers (six state agents, six 
local regular and six special deputies, as well as sheriffs and 
other deputies from other counties) armed with a dozen shot-
guns raided the Shangri La Club owned by Leo Kublik at Carter 
Lake on the Nebraska/Iowa border north of Council Bluffs. 
In all, 127 bottles were seized at the club and another 48 were 
found in a car in the driveway. Several days later, in an action 
that was the result of undercover work by state agents, police 
raided the Chateau Club in Clinton, arresting owner Peter Ran-
kins of Camanche and confiscating 19 bottles of liquor. Raids 
continued in other areas of the state.54 
 Davenport’s over-the-counter liquor merchants proved to 
be more resilient than others in the state and received continued 
close attention from state agents. Another series of raids was 
planned in Davenport for Saturday evening, March 30, after 
state agents had either bought illegal liquor or watched it being 
sold in six Davenport establishments. The raids were called off 
after an agent overheard a barmaid in one tavern telling a cus-
tomer every detail of the plan, including the places to be raided, 
the exact times, and where the agents were to gather before 
staging the raids. Davenport law enforcement officials were 
blamed for the leak, creating some tension between them and 
state agents. Several days later, Hughes himself mentioned the 
cancelled raids in a Des Moines news conference, referring only 
to “a border city” and indicating that state agents might operate 
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there in the future with minimal local involvement. That was the 
policy when six state agents simultaneously raided two down-
town Davenport taverns on the evening of Wednesday, May 1, 
without the knowledge or assistance of the Davenport police, 
seizing four bottles and a glass at one place and three bottles 
and a glass at the other.55  
 Hughes was well aware that the statewide crackdown was 
putting a strain on Iowa law enforcement. At the end of March, 
he acknowledged that other law enforcement efforts were suffer-
ing because state agents were assigned to liquor enforcement. 
“If these agents are devoting their time to liquor law enforce-
ment, they cannot take part in investigations of murders, rob-
beries, burglaries and other crimes. But until present liquor laws 
are changed, they must be enforced.” The message was clear 
to legislators meeting in Des Moines: pass liquor-by-the-drink 
reform or face the dire consequences of hampered law enforce-
ment—to say nothing of the negative economic impact suffered 
by many merchants.56  
 
A MINIMUM of 55 votes was needed for passage in the 108-
member Iowa House. One legislator who was a longtime advo-
cate of liquor by the drink said in mid-January that he could 
count only 41 House members likely to support such legislation. 
Assistant House Majority Leader John Camp (R-Brant) counted 
35 “drys,” 40 “wets,” and 33 undecideds. Camp believed that 
seven or eight among the undecided would vote for a “good bill 
if convinced there are enough votes to pass it”; another two or 
three would vote for a bill containing a provision for compulsory 
testing of persons arrested for driving while intoxicated, leaving 
50 to 52 votes for a possible liquor-by-the-drink bill, just shy of a 
majority. At the beginning of the 1963 legislature, supporters of 
liquor by the drink had work to do.57 
 The divide between “wets” and “drys” was not partisan; it 
was an urban/rural issue, with members of each camp in both 
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parties. Democrats, led by Hughes, were for the most part on the 
side of change, though there were a few opponents within the 
party. The great battle was among the Republicans. Party leaders, 
such as George Nagle and Norman Erbe (after his change of 
heart), were on the side of reform. Given that the Republican 
platform in 1962 called for a “re-evaluation” of liquor laws, the 
Republican leadership in the legislature felt obligated to fully 
debate liquor by the drink in both chambers and not hold it up 
in committee. Some in the GOP privately argued that they 
could not afford to give Hughes a political victory by supporting 
and passing his liquor pledge; others, like Nagle, countered by 
warning that, if they did not pass liquor by the drink, Hughes 
would again carry the issue to the public in 1964—with possibly 
disastrous results for Republicans.58  
 Rural Republicans were also uneasy about another 1963 po-
litical issue—the Shaff Plan for legislative reapportionment—
that could be linked to the liquor issue. The Shaff Plan, drawn 
up by the Iowa Farm Bureau Federation and named after Re-
publican State Senator David Shaff of Clinton, called for a 99-
member House with one representative from each county and a 
Senate based on population. This was a compromise put forth 
by rural interests to deflect comprehensive change to a legislature 
based entirely on population. The plan had passed as a consti-
tutional amendment in the 1961 session of the legislature and 
would pass again in 1963; the proposal would go before the 
people in December 1963. Some Shaff supporters feared that, if 
liquor by the drink failed in the 1963 session, urban interests 
would blame the rural bias in the current General Assembly 
and reject the Shaff Plan at the polls. This caused some rural 
politicians to reconsider their longtime opposition to liquor by 
the drink. Another impact of the Shaff Plan was that it could 
potentially set up a House controlled by 24 percent or less of the 
Iowa population, creating a strong rural block to a liquor bill in 
future legislative sessions; this prompted liquor-by-the-drink 
supporters to push aggressively for reform in 1963 or risk losing 
a chance for years.59  
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 The legislative strategy of Hughes and the Democrats was 
to avoid introducing liquor legislation that could be labeled a 
“Democratic bill,” destined for probable defeat in the Republican-
dominated General Assembly. Instead, they decided to partici-
pate in a bipartisan effort. Supporters believed that efforts should 
begin in the Senate, where it had the best chance of passage. 
Thus, in mid-January, legislation was taken up by the Senate 
Judiciary II Committee. (This was one of two Senate Judiciary 
Committees, and it was responsible for liquor legislation.) The 
committee was chaired by Senator Jack Schroeder, Republican 
from Davenport and an ardent backer of liquor by the drink. 
Schroeder, 38 years old and vice president/general counsel of 
General Life of Iowa, had extensive contacts in both chambers; 
he had served several terms in both the Iowa House and Senate 
                                                                                                       
to defeat anyway, 191,421–271,217, in the December 3, 1963, vote. One factor 
was Hughes’s campaign against the measure. See Larew, A Party Reborn, 86. 
Iowans then lived through a series of court battles and political debates, com-
plicated by the U.S. Supreme Court decision, Reynolds v. Sims in 1964, which 
ruled that legislative chambers must be apportioned on population, one-person, 
one-vote, until the issue was settled.  
 
Governor Harold Hughes addresses the Iowa General Assembly. Photo from 
SHSI, Des Moines. 
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and was the former Republican majority leader. It was well 
known that his committee had a solid “wet” majority.60 
 Legislators began their committee work against the back-
drop of statewide and local enforcement of current liquor laws, 
resulting in the “drying of Iowa” and intense statewide lobby-
ing for and against liquor by the drink. At first, it appeared that 
opponents held the upper hand. On January 21 alone, five peti-
tions opposing liquor by the drink were filed in the House with 
only one in favor. Tom Riley, one of the two representatives from 
Linn County, the second most populous county in the state, said 
that he had received 100 letters against a liquor bill and only one 
in favor; John Ely, Linn County’s other representative, had re-
ceived 22 letters against a bill and only one phone call in favor.61 
 Much of the opposition was spearheaded by church leaders, 
particularly the powerful Methodist church, with about 290,000 
members throughout Iowa. Methodist Bishop R. Gerald Ensley 
of Des Moines had already issued a statement in December 1962 
opposing liquor by the drink, saying that it would increase alco-
holism in Iowa and that every dollar collected in taxes would be 
offset by three to five dollars in expenses to combat “crime, pov-
erty and marital misery.” On January 4, the board of directors of 
the Iowa Council of Churches, representing 15 Protestant denom-
inations with 2,600 local congregations and 700,000 members, 
declared its opposition to liquor by the drink. They were joined 
on January 20 by the executive committee of the Iowa Yearly 
Meeting of Friends, which issued a statement that liquor by the 
drink would increase consumption, resulting in loss of life on 
highways and more crime. In late February the Iowa Council of 
Churches conducted an all-day meeting at Wesley Methodist 
Church, a block north of the Iowa Capitol, to discuss its position, 
inviting legislators to dinner and urging local churches statewide 
to invite their legislators to attend.62  
 Religious opposition to liquor by the drink was not unani-
mous, however. Episcopal Bishop Gordon Smith, speaking for 
his church, which had 25,000 members in Iowa, said, “This is 
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not a moral issue with us at all but merely a question of the best 
way to control the use of alcohol. The present Iowa liquor laws 
have proven inadequate to properly control liquor and have 
produced attendant evils including the key club situation and a 
general disrespect for law and order. We should enact liquor-
by-the-drink legislation which can be enforced and accepted by 
the majority of our citizens as the proper way of handling the 
liquor problem.” Speaking for Iowa’s 435,000 Catholics, Bishop 
James J. Burnes observed that “nowhere in history has the 
Church condemned the moderate use of liquor.” Citing respect 
for law and its enforcement, he called the existing liquor laws 
“bad legislation and therefore not law.” Among religious leaders 
supporting change, the most direct was Rabbi Irving A. Wein-
gar of Tifereth Israel Synagogue, Des Moines. “We have no ob-
jection to liquor. We never have a celebration without the use of 
wine. . . . I personally believe that our present liquor laws are a 
farce. We are taking honest people and making them dishonest. 
If liquor is evil, then let’s make an issue of liquor, not of liquor 
by the bottle or by the glass. Certainly people will violate liquor-
by-the-drink laws. But this would be better than what we have 
now—plain drinking without any control.”63 
 Opposition to liquor by the drink also stemmed from a non-
religious body. In a half-page ad appearing in the statewide 
Sunday Des Moines Register in March, the Preferred Risk Mutual 
Insurance Company of Des Moines, calling itself “America’s 
Original Non-Drinkers Auto Insurance Company,” issued a 
message to Iowans, “Is Liquor-by-the-Drink Worth 44 Lives?” 
Citing statistics from surrounding states, the ad argued, “If 
Iowa’s highway death toll had been the same as liquor-by-the-
drink neighbors, it would mean 44 more Iowans killed last year.” 
It urged readers to call, telephone, or write legislators through 
card or letter to tell them to vote against liquor reform. The ad 
also offered readers a free report: “Will Legalizing Liquor-by-
the-Drink Increase the Death Toll on Iowa’s Highways?”64 
 During a press conference in mid-January, against the back-
drop of lobbying efforts by some religious groups and others, 
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Hughes urged “wets” to be more vocal in voicing their opinions 
to legislators. Legislators had told the governor that most of 
their mail was running against liquor by the drink and that 
much of it was organized by religious groups, primarily the 
Methodist church. One rural Democratic legislator told Hughes 
that he was personally in favor of reform but that he had re-
ceived 300 letters against liquor law change and only one in fa-
vor. Hughes insisted that “persons who want the law changed 
must organize in conveying their feelings to legislators.”65 
 The governor was also beginning to play hardball with 
Democratic legislators. In a meeting at the Hotel Savery in Des 
Moines in late January with his party’s legislative caucus, in-
cluding an estimated eight “dry” Democrats, Hughes warned 
that failure to support liquor by the drink “may determine the 
amount of consideration their recommendations for appoint-
ments in state jobs may get.” He added that he would “mobilize 
every man he can find to enforce the present law in the next two 
years, if the legislature does not act on the liquor issue.”66 
 One unexpected argument against liquor reform was that 
enforcement of current law was actually working, so no change 
was needed. A young Charles Grassley, then a state representa-
tive from New Hartford and a solid “dry,” said, “The Hughes 
campaign is proof the law can be enforced and there is little 
need for a change.” But the general feeling among most legisla-
tors was that enforcement was only temporary and could not 
continue, given the strains it placed on law enforcement and 
local economies; after the initial pressure, establishments would 
simply go back to selling liquor. As Representative Scott Swisher 
(D-Iowa City) said, “There are not enough law enforcement 
officers in the state to override the wishes of the people.”67 
 Hughes’s call for petitions and, no doubt, a response to state 
and local enforcement began to bear fruit by early February. An 
unofficial tally of petitions received in the Iowa House showed 
60,000 names in favor of liquor by the drink and 4,000 against.  
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By February 21, nearly 100,000 Iowans had petitioned legislators 
in favor, with only 6,031 against. Representative Riley Dietz (R-
Walcott), who was tracking the petition numbers, said, “In sev-
eral instances, legislators have received more signatures favor-
ing liquor by the drink than they did votes in last November’s 
election.” One representative, after receiving another packet of 
petitions favoring liquor by the drink, said, “I thought my county 
was dry.” In addition to petitions, legislators were being over-
whelmed by letters from voters. George Mills of the Des Moines 
Register called it the “biggest mail session of modern times.”68 
 By mid-February, Governor Hughes was regularly meeting 
with a bipartisan group of legislators from both houses, includ-
ing Schroeder of Davenport and the Senate and House majority 
leaders, to see how votes were lining up on the liquor issue and 
to discuss the shape of legislation. The numbers were looking 
good, though specific legislation had not yet been drawn up. 
The Des Moines Register reported on February 20 that a survey 
of House members showed 58 representatives—36 Republicans 
and 22 Democrats—backed general liquor-by-the-drink legisla-
tion, surpassing the 55 votes needed for passage.69  
 Senator Schroeder, leading the legislative writing of the bill 
and guiding it through the Senate, refused to accept any deals 
or “horse trading” to get liquor by the drink passed. “If legisla-
tors—after receiving the petitions they have received for legaliz-
ing liquor and after the polls indicating the vast majority of 
Iowans are in favor of changing the present laws—aren’t willing 
to vote for a measure on its merits then certainly I’m not going 
to be willing to trade or exert any undue pressure to get a liquor 
bill passed.” He saw passage of the liquor reform effort as noth-
ing less than the preservation of the Iowa Republican Party. 
“My own feeling is that the future of the Republican party in 
Iowa is at stake and that changing the liquor laws could be its 
redemption. If, as the majority party in Iowa, we Republicans 
don’t accede to the wishes of a majority of the people, then 
sooner or later we’ll become the minority party.”70 
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 In a further effort to counter pressure from church groups 
against liquor reform, Democratic and Republican legislative 
supporters met with business leaders at the Wakonda Country 
Club in Des Moines in late February—just ahead of a weeklong 
midterm recess when legislators would be talking with voters. 
At this strategy session, participants urged the business people 
to apply pressure to House members considered “marginal” on 
the liquor issue. Senate Majority Leader Robert Rigler (R-New 
Hampton), one of the leaders of the gathering, said, “It would be 
very helpful if business groups such as Chambers of Commerce 
and commercial clubs take a stand and let their legislators know 
how they feel about liquor by the drink” and “how the business 
men back home felt about it.” Robert Tyson, executive secretary 
of the Republican state central committee, announced on March 1 
that he and other Republicans would fan out across the state 
during the legislative recess to gain additional support for liquor 
by the drink.71  
 As the issue continued to drag on into late March without 
action, Hughes applied public pressure to legislators. In a speech 
at a six-county Democratic dinner in Perry that was publicized 
statewide in a press release, the governor said, “It would be 
disastrous if they wait much longer.” He called on legislative 
leaders to “start taking action—and soon—on a sensible liquor 
control bill.” Repeating his earlier arguments that “we will soon 
see this state drift into an atmosphere of cynicism where there 
will be little respect for any law,” he said that his enforcement 
efforts since January did not “mean we have made Iowa ‘dry’ or 
halted the intemperate use of alcohol. It only means we have 
driven bootlegging in this state further underground. Make no 
mistake about it. If the people of Iowa do not wish Iowa to be 
dry, a few state police agents cannot make it dry.” Tossing aside 
the arguments of some “drys” that enforcement could work in 
the long run, he said that it was temporary at best and liquor-
by-the-drink reform was the only alternative to lawlessness.72 
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PROPOSED LEGISLATION finally emerged from the Senate 
Judiciary II Committee on Wednesday, April 4, on a 7–0 com-
mittee vote. The only token opposition came from Senator Jacob 
Grimstead (R-Lake Mills), a committed “dry” who still spoke 
with a Norwegian accent. By voting “present,” according to the 
Cedar Rapids Gazette, he “yielded to the growing demand for le-
galized glass liquor sales.” (Schroeder told Grimstead at the vote, 
“Jake, you’ve come a long way.”) The committee bill called for a 
10 percent tax on gross receipts from the sale of alcoholic bever-
ages and set up licenses with different fee levels among four 
classes: clubs, hotels/motels, commercial establishments with 
tables and seats for at least 25 people, and airlines and railroads. 
The bill set hour limits on liquor sales. City and town councils 
and county boards of supervisors would have final approval on 
whether liquor licenses would be issued. There was no provi-
sion in the bill for a “local option” vote to prohibit sales within 
counties or towns. After reading the proposed bill, Governor 
Hughes objected to a clause limiting liquor sales to only within 
business districts, which would prevent neighborhood taverns 
from participating, and he said that he would prefer that en-
forcement powers be under the Liquor Commission rather than 
the Bureau of Criminal Investigation. But that was only the be-
ginning of the negotiating process.73  
 The bill’s supporters waited a week before bringing the leg-
islation to the Senate floor. Hoping to get a jump on opponents 
and avoid an avalanche of phone calls to wavering legislators, 
on Wednesday, April 10, at 9:37 a.m. they suddenly announced 
that they would begin debate. Senators Schroeder and David O. 
Shaff led the floor fight for the bill and thwarted most attempts 
to amend it. Opponents—led by Senators Eugene M. Hill (D-
Newton), a farmer, and John A. Walker (R-Williams), a banker 
and farmer—made several attempts to increase license fees, but 
these were rejected. “If we get the cost too prohibitive,” argued 
Schroeder, “it will give incentive to circumvention through 
bootlegging.”74 
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 One turning point in the debate came with the effort to in-
clude “implied consent” in the bill; this meant that, when a citi-
zen signed his or her driver’s license, it implied that the person 
had given consent for chemical tests of breath or body fluid for 
alcohol content if suspected of drunken driving. Presiding over 
the Senate, Lieutenant Governor William Moody ruled the pro-
vision out of order because it was contained in legislation cur-
rently being debated in the House. Without the “implied con-
sent” clause in the proposed legislation, some Senate supporters 
considered changing their vote to “no,” throwing the bill’s pas-
sage into doubt.75  
 As the debate lingered on that day, it was obvious that sup-
porters did not yet have the votes to pass the legislation, so they 
stalled with unplanned speeches and questions while applying 
pressure to undecided senators. The battle was for the votes of 
three individuals—Leigh Curran of Mason City, Donald Beneke 
of Laurens, and Irving Long of Manchester, all Republicans. “At 
midmorning, we had 26 or 27 votes [26 were needed for passage],” 
said one senator supporting liquor by the drink, “but as the 
radio announced over Iowa that the debate was on, the pressure 
started pouring into this chamber.” This included calls from 
ministers and other opponents throughout Iowa; they came in 
person, calling senators off the floor to lobby, and flooded the 
Senate’s telephone switchboard. At late afternoon, Mason City’s 
Curran was at the center of the pressure tactics, receiving calls, 
pro and con, from his home county and taking part in hushed 
discussions in the Senate cloakrooms, aisles, and hallways. Fi-
nally, at 4:41 p.m., talk suddenly stopped in the chamber for the 
first time that day and Senate Secretary Carroll Lane’s voice 
started reading the roll call in alphabetical order. When Leigh 
Curran voted “Aye,” an anonymous voice from the floor cried, 
“That does it!” When the roll call was finished, the Iowa Senate 
had passed its liquor-by-the-drink bill, 26–24.76 
 The final Senate vote divided both political parties. Seventeen 
Republicans and 9 Democrats voted yes; 21 Republicans and 3 
Democrats voted no. In addition to Curran, two other known 
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“drys” voted for the bill: Charles Van Eaton (R-Sioux City) and 
George O’Malley (D-Des Moines). “I’m against liquor in any 
form,” said Van Eaton after the vote. “I am also a practical indi-
vidual. I’ve seen attempts to enforce the present liquor law and 
it can’t be enforced. The whole question is this: Are you going to 
have liquor by the drink in Iowa legal or illegal?” Cedar Rapids 
Gazette reporter Frank Nye added up the county populations rep-
resented by the senators voting for and against the bill, coming 
up with a total of 1,829,362 to 928,175. “This vote pretty well bears 
out the polls which indicated that about two-thirds of Iowa’s 
residents are for legalizing liquor by the drink,” he wrote.77 
 All Iowa eyes then turned to the House. By late April 1963, 
the House had received petitions from 143,022 Iowans in favor 
of liquor by the drink and 29,208 opposed. But several compli-
cations emerged. A group of southwest Iowa House members 
threatened to vote against the liquor bill if the Senate raised the 
Iowa sales tax from 2 to 3 percent to pay for growing state ex-
penses; Representative Conrad Ossian (R-Red Oak), speaking for 
the group, said, “The number is enough to beat a liquor bill.” 
Some representatives proposed legislation forbidding sales of 
beer by any establishment other than a licensed liquor estab-
lishment, drawing fire from tavern operators and grocery stores 
that probably would not choose to get liquor licenses but still 
wanted to sell beer. Others were strongly opposed to the pro-
vision allowing city and town councils and county boards of 
supervisors to have final approval on granting liquor licenses, 
saying it would put enormous pressure on local officials and 
make liquor an issue at every council and supervisor election; 
instead, some favored a vote by the people. Still others insisted 
that the “implied consent” clause be added to the bill. As the 
date of debate neared, House supporters were unsure of the 
bill’s future. “I simply don’t know what’s going to happen,” 
said Representative John Mowry (R-Marshalltown), the bill’s 
floor leader. “I’m not even sure which day we’ll take it up.” 
Hughes predicted that the House would pass reform by one 
vote, saying, “It will be a bloody and close battle.”78 
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 On Wednesday, May 1, 1963, the House began debate by 
voting down a so-called “dry” amendment, 59–49, which 
would have defined beer as an intoxicating beverage, banning 
package sales of beer at grocery and drug stores. By defeating 
that amendment, the House made the Senate bill the liquor ve-
hicle. The likelihood of passage brightened when the block of 
anti–sales tax representatives indicated their support for the bill 
since it looked like the 3 percent tax would go down to defeat 
in the Senate. In turn, liquor-by-the-drink supporters selected 
the leader of the anti-tax group, Representative Bill Scherle (R-
Henderson), to direct the bill in the House. Later that day, the 
House passed the “implied consent” amendment, 79–29, incor-
porating into the bill a mandate that motorists under arrest for 
drinking must take a chemical test for intoxication or automati-
cally lose their license. By then, even “dry” House members 
conceded that a bill would pass. Charles Grassley, who, along 
with nine others, had proposed the implied consent amendment, 
said, “Many sincere drys want to be able to vote for liquor by 
the drink. They have conditioned their action on the acceptance 
of implied consent by the Senate.” While noting that “I would 
like to see liquor by the drink killed every place,” he admitted, 
“It appears that liquor by the drink will pass this session.”79  
 The final House bill was shaped by votes and compromises 
over the next few days. By 71–37, members voted down an effort 
to give counties the right to vote “wet” or “dry” every four years 
when petitioned by 10 percent of those voting for governor in 
the most recent election. The goal was to make it plain that 
counties could not have liquor by the drink unless they voted 
for it. Known as the “dry local option,” this meant that a county 
would be “dry” unless it voted itself “wet,” in contrast to the 
“wet local option,” which would allow counties to vote them-
selves “dry.” The House agreed to the latter, allowing people to 
vote their areas “dry” in special elections. By a vote of 53–51, 
House members also removed the ceiling on the number of li-
censes that could be issued for sale of liquor by the drink by a 
city or town council or a county board of supervisors; supporters 
argued that this would eliminate any under-the-table bidding 
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for licenses, permitting market demand and the public through 
elected officials to determine the number of establishments. The 
vote also removed the provision limiting licenses to within city 
business districts. The House version created an enforcement 
provision authorizing the Iowa Liquor Control Commission to 
police liquor operations throughout the state. Key clubs, which 
were at the center of so much debate over the years, were legis-
lated out of existence; rather than granting Iowans the right to 
bring their own bottles of liquor to store and pour at establish-
ments, legislators, hoping to improve enforcement, granted 
businesses the right to serve drinks to customers.80  
 On May 3, the Iowa House passed its liquor-by-the-drink bill, 
68–40, a more lopsided vote than anyone would have predicted 
months earlier. With all 108 members voting, 45 Republicans 
and 23 Democrats voted for it and 34 Republicans and 6 Demo-
crats opposed it. The Cedar Rapids Gazette’s Nye again added up 
the pro and con county totals based on county populations, 
showing that the 68 yes votes represented 2,073,898 residents and 
the 40 no votes represented 683,639, a 3 to 1 margin. In a state-
ment issued on the day of the House passage, Governor Hughes 
specifically cited for special commendation “the many members 
of the House from nonurban areas who voted for this bill, doing 
what they thought was right despite great pressure of a highly 
emotional nature from their home districts.” He added, “This bill 
will control liquor-by-the-drink, for the first time since Iowa 
became a state in 1846. We have had for the past 107 years hy-
pocrisy, double standards of law enforcement, dry laws and a 
wet state. We have never had adequate liquor control. Today’s 
action by the House is a step toward bringing this to an end.”81  
 The final legislative stage was for the Senate to concur with 
the House amendments. The Senate passed the bill, 27–23, on 
May 9, gaining the vote of an additional senator with passage of 
the “wet local option” feature. The bill then went to Hughes for 
his signature. Even after the agreement of both chambers, some 
looked upon the bill’s passage with gloom. Senator Franklin 
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Main (D-Lamoni) said, “We are approaching a brink of moral 
decay with the passage of this bill.” Others cited historical 
change. Representative John Murray (D-Fort Dodge) believed 
that the law would end “an age of hypocrisy and disrespect for 
the law.” Still others were even-handed. According to Senator 
Donald Beneke (R-Laurens), “This liquor bill won’t produce the 
dire results the drys predict or the rosy future for Iowa the wets 
predict.”82  
 For the man who was the force behind the change—
Governor Harold E. Hughes—the bill’s passage was “states-
manship of the highest order.” At the signing ceremony on 
Tuesday morning, May 14, 1963, Hughes said, “It is the peculiar 
genius of democracy that persons with diverse points of view 
can get together and work out solutions to complex problems 
that are in the public interest. In my opinion, this is exactly 
what happened with this liquor bill. . . . Those who followed the 
development of this legislation were amazed at the way wets 
and dries, Republicans and Democrats, worked together pa-
tiently, subordinating their individual interests to the interest of 
the state as a whole.”83 
 
THE LAW went into effect on July 4, 1963, and the Iowa Liquor 
Commission began to issue licenses the day after the holiday. 
Within days, the commission had approved 567 licenses for 
establishments scattered throughout 64 of Iowa’s 99 counties. 
By the end of the month, 91 counties had liquor by the drink. 
Over the next year, the commission issued 2,452 licenses. Iowa 
liquor sales to over-the-counter buyers in the first year of 
liquor-by-the-drink legalization was $11,778,048 out of the total 
of $49,778,394 in state liquor, wine, and ale sales, an increase of 
more than $5 million from the previous fiscal year. It was im-
possible to estimate sales of liquor drinks—and state income 
that was not collected—from prior years, but presumably most 
over-the-counter liquor sales in fiscal year 1964 were legal and 
taxed. The State of Iowa collected more than $3 million through 
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the 10 percent per drink tax, part of the overall $19 million from 
state liquor sales contributed to the state’s General Fund and 
local city, town, and county governments in fiscal year 1964. 
The state was well on its way to collecting taxes on liquor sales 
that it had missed in prior years.84 
 By 1970, the Liquor Commission was issuing 3,172 licenses 
annually, earning $1,175,675 for the state. By then, the liquor- 
per-drink tax had increased to 15 percent and was contributing 
$3,271,619 to state and local governments. In addition, a 3 per-
cent sales tax that went into effect in 1967 brought in $1,623,384 
to the state coffers from over-the-counter liquor sales. The amount 
of liquor sold to licensees through Iowa monopoly stores to-
taled $21,481,666, with the state earning profits from those sales. 
Liquor by the drink was contributing to the budgets of both 
state and local governments—and it was legal and regulated 
throughout the state.85  
 
WITH THE PASSAGE of liquor by the drink in 1963, legal 
alcohol availability among adults within Iowa became settled 
policy, ending a conflict that had raged in the state since its be-
ginning. To date, there have been no significant efforts by Iowa 
legislators or governors to pull back liquor sales from the gen-
eral adult population. This debate’s demise accompanied the 
transition of Iowa from a state with powerful rural interests that 
kept liquor limitations alive as a political issue to one of more 
urban sensibilities more tolerant of alcohol consumption. 
 Alcohol consumption and distribution were certainly politi-
cal issues in Iowa after 1963, but never in relation to limiting the 
general adult population’s access to liquor. Throughout the 1970s 
and 1980s, the minimum legal drinking age in Iowa fluctuated 
from 21 to 19 to 18 and finally back to 21. Efforts to curb drunken 
driving prompted legislators to establish minimum legal blood 
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alcohol levels and set strict fines, jail time, and driver’s license 
confiscation for violators. During the Farm Crisis of the 1980s, 
Iowa political leaders, who were looking for reductions in state 
expenses, eliminated state liquor monopoly stores and shifted 
to distribution through private businesses. 
 The fundamental reason for the end of this debate on over-
the-counter liquor access in Iowa is that Iowans wanted it to end. 
In the nineteenth century, clear majorities of Iowa voters wanted 
prohibition—as shown in the popular votes of 1847 and 1882—
though enforcement was a significant challenge. Politicians tried 
to chart courses between the desire to eliminate liquor and the 
reality that some Iowans wanted to continue to drink alcohol. 
Prohibition returned in the early twentieth century, but Iowans 
showed that their attitudes were changing by narrowly rejecting 
state constitutional prohibition in 1917 and voting for repeal of 
national prohibition in 1933. In 1934 Iowans turned to a state 
monopoly distribution system to manage and control liquor 
sales, but soon residents, wanting expanded availability, voted 
with their actions by defying the law in many quarters. When 
Harold Hughes gave Iowans a clear choice in 1962 to open the 
state to liquor by the drink, they voted him into office. That was 
not the only issue in the campaign, but it was a significant one, 
and his victory was seen as a mandate to change Iowa’s liquor 
laws. Given the tools of government, Hughes—with bipartisan 
support in the Iowa legislature—aggressively fought to accom-
modate the will of Iowans of the time. This reform of Iowa’s 
liquor laws closed a debate among Iowans that had been fought 
for over a century, making it Iowa’s last liquor battle. 
